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In the late 1970s, a modest scholarly clash took place between James
C. Scott and Michael Adas over the extent to which, if at all, the
British administration in Burma had granted tax remissions to the
rural population of the province during the economic crisis of the
early 1930s. This formed an important part of their wider debate
on the causes of the major rebellion—the Hsaya San rebellion—
which erupted in Lower Burma in the closing days of 1930. First
into the arena was Scott, in The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion
and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, published in 1976. On this issue,
Scott’s starting point was the observation that the colonial world of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw a very marked
increase in the capacity of the state to extract tax revenues from
rural populations. The decisive strength of colonial administrations
in this respect lay in paperwork, in ‘the inexorable progress of cadas-
tral surveys, settlement reports for land revenue, censuses, the issu-
ance of land titles and licenses, identity cards, tax rolls and receipts
. . .’, in other words, in the creation of ‘nets of finer and finer official
weave’1 that trapped rural taxpayers with increasing thoroughness.
The creation of ever-finer fiscal nets was simply part, although an
important part, of a great expansion in the administrative apparatus
of colonial government in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, as, in addition, it undertook the creation of centralized
structures of local administration, the construction of railways, roads,
and irrigation works, and the delivery of education, health, and
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public order. But of course, that expansion required ever-larger rev-
enues. Here, therefore, was a neat twist. By this period, the very size
of the state apparatus made it possible for colonial government to
enforce tax demands on rural populations with far greater thor-
oughness: but at the same time, made it imperative that it actually
did so. With escalating administrative costs, notably burgeoning
public payrolls, the colonial state simply could not afford to be leni-
ent with rural taxpayers.
This harsh reality was fully evident, suggested Scott, in Burma in
the inter-war years. Remission of the capitation tax and the land
revenue was, he argued, ‘comparatively rare’ and, when granted,
‘seldom more than a small percentage of the loss in crops or
income’.2 This was so even when, or perhaps particularly when, the
price of paddy collapsed during the depression, in effect tripling the
real burden of the capitation tax and the land revenue: desperate
to stabilize its income during the economic crisis, the British admin-
istration had no choice but ruthlessly to enforce its tax demands.
Scott focused on the capitation tax, because, in his view, it was the
capitation tax—or rather the refusal of the colonial authorities to
grant remissions on it during the depression crisis—‘which provided
the detonator’ for the Hsaya San rebellion.3 He pointed out that
among the rural population of Lower Burma, the capitation tax was
‘a unifying issue par excellence . . . [Whether] smallholders, tenants,
or laborers, the capitation tax was the single material claim that
weighed on all of them at a given, regular time’.4 Moreover, that in
raising the rural delta to rebellion, Hsaya San and his lieutenants
constantly urged resistance to government collection of the tax; that
a central feature of the millenarian vision propounded by Hsaya San
was of a world without taxes; and, crucially, that the rebellion had
erupted, in Tharrawaddy District, on 22 December 1930, just nine
days before collection of the capitation tax was due, and one day
2 Ibid. Scott’s supporting reference for this important assertion is somewhat baf-
fling. His source is the Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine the Land Revenue
System of Burma, Rangoon: Government Printing, 1922, 2 volumes. But his page
references are not to the report itself (volume I) but to the written evidence taken
by the committee (volume II). The first reference (p. 4), the evidence of W. E.
Lowry, the Financial Commissioner, makes no mention of remissions. The second
(pp. 233, et seq.) reproduces passages relating to remissions from the annual Report
on the Land Revenue Administration of Burma, covering almost all the 1910s, which, it
seems to me, show frequent and extensive remissions.
3 Ibid., p. 151.
4 Ibid., p. 155.
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after cultivators in Tharrawaddy had had a petition for reduction or
postponement of the tax rejected by the acting governor, no less.5
The dismissal of Scott by Michael Adas came in the latter’s Prophets
of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements against the European Colonial
Order, published in 1979. Perhaps surprisingly he focused on remis-
sion of the land revenue, while Scott, of course, had concentrated on
the capitation tax. Adas argued that the land revenue system which
the British had put in place in Burma, far from being brutally rigid,
was markedly responsive to the cultivator’s circumstances. The rev-
enue was calculated as a percentage of the net output of the cultiv-
ator’s land that was adjusted for differences in, for example, soil type
and water conditions. The revenue demand was varied annually, the
assessment in Lower Burma being based on the number of acres
cultivated. Local officials had considerable discretion: ‘After years in
the field many district officers became quite sensitive to variations
in local conditions and adjusted revenue demands accordingly.’6 But,
crucially, in addition to that structural flexibility, and in flat contra-
diction to Scott’s assertions, ‘hundreds of thousands of rupees in land
revenue remissions [were] granted by the Government of Burma all
through the years of the Depression—remissions that were given
despite falling revenue returns.’7
The principal aim of this paper is to settle this clash of views.
During the 1930s depression crisis, did the British administration
in Burma grant unusual remissions of land revenue and the capita-
tion tax: and if so, at what point in time were the remissions made
(this may be an important consideration when examining the causes
of the Hsaya San rebellion), and what scale of relief did they provide
for the cultivators of the rice delta during those difficult years?
I
The land revenue was very important for the Burma administration.
Of the total revenue at the disposal of the provincial government in
1926/27, to select a pre-depression year almost at random, just over
5 Ibid., pp. 153–5.
6 Michael Adas, Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements against the Euro-
pean Colonial Order (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), p. 201,
fn. 94. The book was republished by Cambridge University Press in 1987.
7 Ibid. Emphasis in original.
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31 per cent came from the land revenue.8 The foundation of land
revenue administration in Burma was the settlement inquiry under-
taken in each district of the province in rough sequence over a twenty
to thirty year cycle.9 Involving highly detailed surveys and investi-
gations—that commonly took around two years—the settlement
inquiry determined the land revenue rate for every agricultural hold-
ing in that district. The revenue settlement, in various forms, was of
course the foundation of land revenue administration across British
India. But while in some Indian provinces, notably Bombay, the rev-
enue demand on a holding as fixed at settlement ordinarily remained
unchanged year after year for as long as the settlement was in force,
regardless of annual variations in the holding’s output, in the prov-
ince of Burma, as Adas emphasized, the revenue demand was
assessed each year to take account of fluctuations in production: in
Lower Burma, where cultivation was relatively secure, the measure
of a holding’s production was the area under cultivation. Indeed, the
Burma administration pointedly resisted pressure from the Govern-
ment of India to abandon fluctuating for fixed assessment, despite
the fact that the latter procedure would clearly have required consid-
erably less resources. Moreover, again as noted by Adas, remission
provisions in the province were quite generous. Ordinarily a cultiv-
ator was entitled to remission on the land revenue if he lost—for
example through flood damage—one-third or more of his normal full
crop, and the remission granted was proportional to the loss
incurred. Revenue officials in the districts were given ‘great power’
in granting relief.10
The capitation tax was a much less important source of government
revenue, in 1926/27 accounting for a little under six per cent of the
total revenue at the disposal of the Government of Burma.11 It was
imposed only in Lower Burma.12 It was levied on males between the
8 Report on the Administration of Burma for the year 1926–1927 (Rangoon: Govern-
ment Printing and Stationery, 1928), pp. 9, 72. The proceeds from certain classes
of revenue, including customs duty and income tax, were assigned to the Govern-
ment of India.
9 An excellent contemporary account of Burma’s land revenue system can be
found in J. S. Furnivall, An Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma (Rangoon:
Burma Book Club, 1931), pp. 204–25. Furnivall, at one time Commissioner of Set-
tlements and Land Records in Burma, had been chairman of a major official inquiry
into this subject at the beginning of the 1920s: Report of the Committee Appointed to
Examine the Land Revenue System of Burma.
10 Furnivall, An Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma, p. 222.
11 Report on the Administration of Burma for the year 1926–1927, pp. 72–3.
12 Its counterpart in Upper Burma was the thathameda, ‘a tax on income derived,
whether by cultivators or non-cultivators, from non-agricultural sources’: Furnivall,
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ages of eighteen and sixty, at the rate of Rs. 5 a year for a married
man and Rs. 2–8 for a bachelor:13 presumably, therefore, it could be
regarded as a tax on marriage! Certain groups were exempt—govern-
ment officials, school teachers, and monks: interestingly, ‘poverty’ or
‘no means of subsistence’ was also a ground for exemption. The capita-
tion tax was unpopular, hugely so of course with Burmese taxpayers
and protest movements but also with many senior British officials, and
a government committee was appointed in 1926 to consider whether
alternative sources of revenue might be found.14 Perhaps the most
powerful criticism was that the tax, by its very nature, was highly
regressive: ‘the man with an income of nine hundred rupees pays no
more than the labourer with ninety’.15 A further major complaint was
that the tax was collected between August and October, the months
immediately before the harvest, when the agriculturist was particu-
larly short of cash. Most therefore were forced to borrow in order to
pay—which increased the agriculturist’s tax burden, lined the pockets
of the moneylender, while adding nothing to the government’s income.
An inquiry into the condition of agricultural tenants and labourers in
the mid-1920s recommended that collection of the capitation tax take
place between January and March, the date being varied by district and
adjusted each year to reflect, for each locality, when the harvest was
taken and therefore when the agriculturist had cash.16 Subsequently
the date on which the tax became due was moved to 1 January. This
was the position when the economic crisis hit Burma.
II
The crisis struck in 1930. Perhaps the most accurate, certainly the
most visible indicator of turns in the economic fortunes of Lower
Burma over the short term was the movement in rice prices. In the
op. cit., p. 202. Indeed the capitation tax was imposed in no other part of British
India. It was justified in Lower Burma with the argument that no salt tax was levied
in the province and that the rates of land tax there were low: Report of the Committee
Appointed to Examine the Land Revenue System of Burma, vol. I, pp. 26–7.
13 Report of the Capitation and Thathameda Taxes Enquiry Committee, 1926–27
(Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationery, 1927), p. 2.
14 Ibid., p. 1.
15 Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine the Land Revenue System of Burma, p.
127.
16 T. Cooper, Report of Inquiry into the Condition of Agricultural Tenants and Labourers
(Rangoon: Government Printing, 1924 [reprinted Rangoon: Central Press, 1966]),
pp. 53–5.
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late 1920s, the year-on-year price of rice at Rangoon, comparing
January with January, had fallen modestly. But 1930 opened with
prices markedly down on the figures for January 1929. Prices rose a
little over the middle months of the year—following the normal sea-
sonal pattern—but then, from around September, plummeted. The
wholesale price of White, Small Mills Specials, for example, fell 43
per cent between July 1930 and January 1931.17
Not surprisingly, the early months of 1930 saw strong calls for
lenient treatment of rural taxpayers. At the budget session of the
Legislative Council, resolutions were passed recommending post-
ponement of collection of the land revenue, which ordinarily began
on 15 February, to June, and a substantial reduction in the rates
levied.18 The government rejected these recommendations. It was by
no means certain that any category of agriculturist would gain from
postponement. No labourers and few tenants paid land revenue. The
small owner-cultivator usually sold his crop immediately it was har-
vested, that is by February, and he should therefore be better placed
to pay the land revenue on the due date, 15 February, than later.
Perhaps the large landowner might benefit from postponement, in
that it could help him hold on to his crop until prices rose later in
the season: on the other hand, given the current state of the rice
market, it was impossible to be confident that prices would in fact
rise in the coming months. But if it was extremely unlikely that the
agriculturist would gain, at least in the government’s view, there was
no doubt that the government itself would lose: postponement of
collection of the land revenue from February to June would turn a
modest projected surplus in the government’s finances for the finan-
cial year ending on 31 March 1930 into a large deficit. As for the
call for a reduction in the rates of land revenue, the government
pointed out that the Burma Settlement Instructions provided for
reduction ‘when a serious and not merely temporary fall occurs in
the prices of [padi] below the normal prices assumed at settle-
ment’.19 Those circumstances had not yet arisen: despite recent falls,
prices were still above those assumed at settlement in many districts.
As the rice price plunged over the final months of 1930, the calls
17 I have provided a fuller account of these price movements in ‘The Economic
Crisis and Rebellion in Rural Burma in the Early 1930s’, in Ryoshin Minami, Kwan
S. Kim, and Malcolm Falkus (eds), Growth, Distribution, and Political Change: Asia and
the Wider World (Basingstoke: Macmillan, forthcoming).
18 Rangoon Gazette Weekly Budget [henceforth RGWB], 10 March 1930, p. 25.
19 Ibid.
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for relief grew still stronger. In November, an organized meeting of
over three thousand landowners, cultivators, rice millers, and
moneylenders in Insein District called for collection of the land rev-
enue to be moved to 30 June and for ‘drastic cuts’ in the rates.20 At
around the same time, cultivators in Tharrawaddy petitioned the
government for reduction or postponement of the capitation tax.
Again the government refused to yield. As noted above, for James
Scott the rejection of the Tharrawaddy petition, on 21 December,
was important in precipitating the outbreak of the Hsaya San rebel-
lion, the following day.
Less than two weeks after the outbreak of the rebellion, the gov-
ernment signalled a shift in its attitude, announcing in a press com-
munique´ released on 2 January 1931 that it ‘has had under consid-
eration’ a temporary reduction in land revenue rates in some
districts.21 It is tempting to see in this the government being
forced—even panicked—into greater leniency by the rebellion. But
there are a number of considerations which might suggest otherwise.
First, in the opening days of 1931 it would not have been evident
that the disturbances which had just broken out in Tharrawaddy—
serious though they were—marked the beginning of a major rebel-
lion. Indeed, as government forces had overrun the rebel headquar-
ters on 31 December 1930, there were grounds for believing—
briefly—that the crisis had passed. In addition, at no point did the
colonial administration accept—at least in public—that the rebellion
had significant economic causes. The final published report on the
rebellion argued that ‘there is not a scintilla of evidence in support
of the thesis . . . that the rebellion . . . was the spontaneous revolt of
an ignorant peasantry impoverished by the slump in paddy prices and
maddened by harsh taxation, that it was chiefly due to oppression on
the part of tax collectors, and that it was precipitated by [the acting
governor’s rejection of the Tharrawaddy petition for reduction or
postponement of the capitation tax] on the 21st December 1930’.22
In view of this, it is difficult to argue that the administration’s meas-
ures to reduce the tax burden on the cultivator were provoked—to
any significant degree—by the outbreak of the rebellion. And finally,
in one crucial respect the press communique´ issued on 2 January
1931 did not mark a change in the government’s position. In March
20 RGWB, 24 November 1930, p. 8.
21 RGWB, 12 January 1931, p. 18.
22 The Origin and Causes of the Burma Rebellion (1930–32) (Rangoon: Government
Printing and Stationery, 1934), p. 44.
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1930 it had rejected a call for a reduction in the rates of land rev-
enue on the grounds that rice prices were still above those assumed
at settlement. By the end of the year, for a number of districts, this
was no longer the case. That in itself was sufficient to trigger a more
lenient administration of the revenue.
The reductions, remissions, and postponements granted from the
beginning of 1931 were as follows. With respect to the land revenue,
at the beginning of 1931 itself, the administration took three meas-
ures. It reduced the rate in fifteen districts where the price of the
main crop was now below the price assumed when the district was
last settled.23 Only three of the districts—Myaungmya, Maubin, and
Pyapoˆn—were in the rice delta. For each district the size of the
reduction was determined by the difference between the current crop
price and the price assumed at settlement,24 and ranged from one-
third to one-tenth. Second, the administration put back the date on
which collection of the land revenue would begin, from 15 February
to 7 March, to give the cultivator more time to sell his crop.25 And
finally, district officers were given discretion to remit land revenue
in those cases where they were satisfied that there was a genuine
inability to pay, and instructed to resort to the sale of land to recover
arrears of revenue only where necessary ‘to meet contumacious
default’.26 In the following year, 1931/32, that is the land revenue
administration year which ended on 30 June 1932, the government
repeated the rate reductions in the fifteen districts: in addition it
appointed ‘an exceptionally large number of special remission
officers’.27 In 1932/33, rice prices were considerably down, and con-
sequently, for the first time, the administration reduced land rev-
enue rates throughout the rice delta—by one-seventh or one-
eighth.28 Rice prices went lower still in 1933/34, and the
administration responded by further reducing land revenue rates in
the delta districts and by urging district officers ‘to show all possible
23 Report on the Land Revenue Administration of Burma [henceforth RLRAB], During
the Year ended the 30th June 1931 [henceforth 1930/31] (Rangoon: Government Print-
ing and Stationery, 1932), pp. 4–5.
24 This was the formula reported in Chief Secretary, Home and Political Depart-
ment, Government of Burma to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home
Department, 6 February 1933. National Archives of India, New Delhi [henceforth
NAI], Home, Political, 7/3, 1933.
25 RGWB, 9 February 1931, p. 1.
26 RGWB, 25 May 1931, p. 20.
27 RLRAB, 1931/32, pp. 4–5, 7, 17.
28 RLRAB, 1932/33, p. 5.
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consideration to assessees who [are] really unable to pay promptly’.29
In 1934/35, prices were slightly up, and this triggered a smaller
reduction in land revenue rates: for example, in Irrawaddy Division,
the reduction, one-fifth in 1933/34, was now one-sixth.30
With respect to the capitation tax, at the beginning of 1931, district
officers involved in its collection were instructed ‘to avoid unduly har-
assing’ assessees, and ‘to exercise careful discretion’ before initiating
legal proceedings in cases of non-payment.31 But for that year—the
year which would end on 30 June 1931—there was no reduction in the
rates of capitation tax. However, for the following year, 1931/32, there
was a reduction of one-quarter.32 For the three subsequent years, the
reduction was slightly less—one-fifth.33 And in 1935/36, with eco-
nomic conditions clearly improved, the reduction was one-tenth.34 But,
as noted earlier, the capitation tax had long been strongly disliked by
both the Burmese taxpayer and many senior British officials, and in
1937 the administration announced its gradual abolition, beginning
with a two-fifths reduction in the rates for 1937/38.35 The capitation
tax would be collected for the final time in 1940/41.
Some insight into the impact of these measures on the administra-
tion of the revenue in the rice delta is provided by the figures for
demand, remissions, collections, and outstandings published annu-
ally by the government in its Report on the Land Revenue Administration
of Burma. The figures for the land revenue in three major delta dis-
tricts—Tharrawaddy, Hanthawaddy, and Pegu—in the late 1920s
and early 1930s are given in Tables 1, 2 and 3. In all three districts
there was a considerable reduction in the land revenue demand—
from 1931/32 in Tharrawaddy, from 1932/33 in Hanthawaddy and
in Pegu. In part, of course, this reflected the reductions in land rev-
enue rates, applied throughout the rice delta from the administra-
29 RLRAB, 1933/34, pp. 5–6, 8–9.
30 RLRAB, 1934/35, pp. 4–6. No fractional reduction was necessary in Han-
thawaddy District, as revised land revenue rates, that would reduce the revenue
demand by some six lakh, were introduced in 1934/35 following a new settlement
of the district.
31 Secretary to the Government of Burma, Revenue Department to the Secretary
to the Government of India, Home Department, 23 January 1931. NAI, Home,
Political, 77/31, 1931, A.
32 RLRAB, 1931/32, p. 9.
33 RLRAB, 1932/33, p. 10; RLRAB, 1933/34, p. 10; RLRAB, 1934/35, p. 9.
34 RLRAB, 1935/36, p. 8.
35 RLRAB, 1936/37, p. 7; Ronald M. J. Harris, ‘Intended Abolition of the Capita-
tion and Thathameda Taxes: Genesis of the Question’, 17 June 1937. India Office
Collections, L/F/7/343.
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TABLE 1
Land Revenue in Tharrawaddy District, 1926/27–1934/35 (in rupees)
Year Demand Remissions Collections Outstandings
1926/27 1,658,994 36,978 [2.2] 1,588,652 33,364 [2.0]
[95.8]
1927/28 1,597,176 33,890 [2.1] 1,546,065 17,221 [1.1]
[96.8]
1928/29 1,619,180 41,199 [2.5] 1,562,458 15,523 [1.0]
[96.5]
1929/30 1,668,530 3,193 [0.2] 1,661,659 3,678 [0.2]
[99.6]
1930/31 1,660,671 7,863 [0.5] 1,396,051 256,757 [15.5]
[84.0]
1931/32 1,514,022 156,356 [10.3] 1,353,783 3,883 [0.3]
[89.4]
1932/33 1,384,917 159,795 [11.5] 1,222,357 2,765 [0.2]
[88.3]
1933/34 1,383,993 4,452 [0.3] 1,371,233 8,308 [0.6]
[99.1]
1934/35 1,402,160 10,866 [0.8] 1,390,892 402 [0.0]
[99.2]
Source: Report on the Land Revenue Administration of Burma. Rangoon: Government
Printing and Stationery, annually.
Notes:
Land Revenue: excluding Irrigation Credits.
Demand: Original demand in assessment rolls.
Year: ending the 30th June. Thus 1926/27 = 1 July 1926 to 30 June 1927.
Figures in brackets: as percentage of revenue demand.
TABLE 2
Land Revenue in Hanthawaddy District, 1926/27–1934/35 (in rupees)
Year Demand Remissions Collections Outstandings
1926/27 3,091,749 81,569 [2.6] 2,986,636 [96.6] 23,544 [0.8]
1927/28 3,092,695 85,766 [2.8] 3,003,102 [97.1] 3,827 [0.1]
1928/29 3,087,764 159,637 [5.2] 2,928,127 [94.8] 0
1929/30 3,085,913 99,564 [3.2] 2,986,306 [96.8] 43 [0.0]
1930/31 3,093,835 28,655 [0.9] 2,957,610 [95.6] 107,570 [3.5]
1931/32 2,993,636 168,003 [5.6] 2,721,410 [90.9] 104,223 [3.5]
1932/33 2,658,293 38,305 [1.4] 2,490,403 [93.7] 129,585 [4.9]
1933/34 2,523,094 33,368 [1.3] 2,422,636 [96.0] 67,090 [2.7]
1934/35 2,369,860 26,451 [1.1] 2,332,088 [98.4] 11,321 [0.5]
Source and notes: as Table 1.
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TABLE 3
Land Revenue in Pegu District, 1926/27–1934/35 (in rupees)
Year Demand Remissions Collections Outstandings
1926/27 2,361,062 0 2,361,062 0
[100.0]
1927/28 2,533,528 0 2,533,528 0
[100.0]
1928/29 2,549,098 0 2,549,098 0
[100.0]
1929/30 2,497,940 0 2,497,940 0
[100.0]
1930/31 2,367,359 4,724 [0.2] 2,002,771 359,864 [15.2]
[84.6]
1931/32 2,279,562 379,732 [16.6] 1,455,909 443,921 [19.5]
[63.9]
1932/33 2,003,406 151,966 [7.6] 1,436,929 414,511 [20.7]
[71.7]
1933/34 1,912,984 150,418 [7.9] 1,456,642 305,924 [16.0]
[76.1]
1934/35 1,924,368 244,721 [12.7] 1,593,050 86,597 [4.5]
[82.8]
Source and notes: as Table 1.
tion year 1932/33. But at times it also reflected a decline in the area
assessed for revenue. In 1931/32 there was a decline in every district
in the Pegu and Irrawaddy Divisions—for a variety of reasons, many,
but not all, arising from the economic crisis: failure of the late rains;
floods; the disturbed condition of many districts because of the rebel-
lion; the intimidation of cultivators who sought tenancies from
Indian landowners; the seizure of holdings for non-payment of rev-
enue in previous years; the abandonment of holdings because of the
depression in the paddy market or difficulties in securing cultivation
loans.36 As Adas would note, here was a clear demonstration of the
benefit to the rural taxpayer of a system of land revenue administra-
tion that employed annual assessment to take account of year-by-
year fluctuations in crop production.
But in other important respects there were considerable differences
between the three districts. Tharrawaddy in the late 1920s had a
stable land revenue demand and low rates of remissions and outstand-
ings (and thus a high collections rate). That pattern disintegrated in
the administration year 1930/31. It seems clear that the fall in the
price of rice in the final months of 1930 was too sudden and too great
36 RLRAB, 1931/32, pp. 5–6.
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for the local administration to take action in the time available and
reduce the revenue demand or increase remissions, and that con-
sequently those who owned land protected themselves by defaulting on
a substantial scale. Outstandings in that year soared to 15.5 per cent
of the revenue demand. But in the following two years, 1931/32 and
1932/33, the administration in Tharrawaddy did respond by reducing
the land revenue demand and by increasing remissions, the latter
rising to 10.3 per cent and then 11.5 per cent of the demand. These
measures appear to have been well-judged, for the rate of outstandings
in those two years was extremely low. But of course the cost of reduced
demand and increased remissions was a substantial fall in collections.
At its lowest, in 1932/33, the income from the land revenue in Tharra-
waddy District was just 73.6 per cent of its pre-crisis peak, which had
been in 1929/30. In Hanthawaddy, the administration of the land rev-
enue during the depression crisis was strikingly stable. Outstandings
remained modest, while the rate of remissions, with the exception of a
moderate leap in 1931/32, was in fact below that of the late 1920s.
Thus relief for the Hanthawaddy landowners came with the substan-
tial reduction in land revenue demand. The percentage fall in collec-
tions in the district was almost as great as that in Tharrawaddy.
In contrast, the administration of the land revenue in Pegu Dis-
trict appears to have been in disarray. In the four years 1926/27 to
1929/30, there had been no remissions and no outstandings. When
the crisis struck, in the administration year 1930/31, landowners in
Pegu, like those in Tharrawaddy, protected themselves by defaulting
on a large scale. But unlike Tharrawaddy, in Pegu outstandings
remained high over the following three years—no less than 20.7 per
cent of the revenue demand in 1932/33. At the same time, the local
administration was reducing the revenue demand and granting sub-
stantial remissions—16.6 per cent of the demand in 1931/32. The
result was a collapse in collections, far more serious than those
taking place in Tharrawaddy and Hanthawaddy. In 1932/33 the
income from the land revenue in Pegu District was a mere 56.4 per
cent of its 1928/29 level. With the evidence available, there is no
obvious explanation for this outcome. It would be difficult to argue
that cultivation conditions in Pegu were that different from those in
Tharrawaddy and Hanthawaddy, or that the disruption to the admin-
istration of the land revenue arising from the Hsaya San rebellion
was more severe there. Perhaps the most that can be said is that the
soaring outstandings in Pegu—at or near one-fifth of the revenue
demand in each of the four years beginning with 1930/31, and this
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TABLE 4
Capitation Tax in Tharrawaddy District, 1926/27–1934/35 (in rupees)
Year Demand Remissions Collections Outstandings
1926/27 432,992 25,917 [6.0] 403,544 [93.2] 3,531 [0.8]
1927/28 428,759 25,911 [6.0] 402,427 [93.9] 421 [0.1]
1928/29 436,604 17,473 [4.0] 419,050 [96.0] 81 [0.0]
1929/30 446,500 13,780 [3.1] 432,720 [96.9] 0
1930/31 452,053 36,046 [8.0] 371,655 [82.2] 44,352 [9.8]
1931/32 320,055 17,405 [5.4] 302,192 [94.5] 458 [0.1]
1932/33 340,241 29,674 [8.7] 310,567 [91.3] 0
1933/34 342,690 22,133 [6.5] 320,557 [93.5] 0
1934/35 378,656 22,851 [6.0] 355,805 [94.0] 0
Source: Report on the Land Revenue Administration of Burma. Rangoon: Government
Printing and Stationery, annually.
Notes:
Year: ending the 30th June. Thus 1926/27 = 1 July 1926 to 30 June 1927.
Figures in brackets: as percentage of tax demand.
despite the reductions in the demand and increased remissions—
would suggest weaknesses within the Pegu administration itself, per-
haps structural flaws or failure on the part of individuals.37
Turning to the administration of the capitation tax during the
depression crisis, it is necessary to provide the figures for just two
districts, simply because there was less variation across the rice
delta. Given the pivotal position of the tax in James Scott’s analysis
of the causes of the Hsaya San rebellion, one of those districts must
be Tharrawaddy—the site of the first outbreak.
TABLE 5
Capitation Tax in Insein District, 1926/27–1934/35 (in rupees)
Year Demand Remissions Collections Outstandings
1926/27 267,310 20,240 [7.6] 247,070 [92.4] 0
1927/28 264,488 38,133 [14.4] 226,355 [85.6] 0
1928/29 267,238 25,991 [9.7] 241,247 [90.3] 0
1929/30 273,460 19,284 [7.0] 254,176 [93.0] 0
1930/31 269,192 48,097 [17.8] 217,940 [81.0] 3,155 [1.2]
1931/32 189,519 11,842 [6.2] 154,044 [81.3] 23,633 [12.5]
1932/33 197,680 19,068 [9.7] 150,517 [76.1] 28,095 [14.2]
1933/34 202,676 21,441 [10.6] 178,763 [88.2] 2,472 [1.2]
1934/35 213,788 22,846 [10.7] 187,669 [87.8] 3,273 [1.5]
Source and notes: as Table 4.
37 Some support for this view comes from the odd critical remark in the govern-
ment’s annual revenue report, although none, as far as I can see, was directed at
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In both Tharrawaddy and Insein—indeed in every district in Lower
Burma—the most striking feature of the administration of the cap-
itation tax during the depression crisis was the sharp reduction in
the tax demand in the administration year 1931/32. The reduction
was principally due, of course, to the cut in the capitation tax rate—
by one-quarter—agreed by the administration for that year.38 But it
also reflected a fall in the numbers assessed for the tax. In the 1920s
the total number of assessees had risen by around 1.5 per cent each
year, with the increase in population.39 But in the crisis year 1931/
32 the total fell sharply, by almost 100,000 or over six per cent. And
although it recovered within a few years, in individual districts—for
example in Hanthawaddy and Pyapoˆn—the number of assessees in
the mid-1930s was still substantially below that of the late 1920s.40
These reductions had several causes. The fall in the number assessed
for the capitation tax in Tharrawaddy in 1931/32 was attributed to
the rebellion, which had forced people to migrate to other districts
in search of peace or work, and to the closure of a number of local
rice mills by the trade crisis, which, again, had driven people from
the area to look for work elsewhere.41 The fall in Pegu, Hanthawaddy,
and Pyapoˆn Districts in the same year was explained by the hurried
exodus of a large part of the Indian population in the face of serious
communal violence, much of it fired by the rebellion. Interestingly,
in Insein in the following year it was attributed in part to ‘omissions
by slack and inefficient headmen’.42
When the economic crisis struck with full force, in 1930/31, the
administration in Tharrawaddy responded by increasing remissions
on the capitation tax, to 8.0 per cent of the demand. Even so, those
liable for the tax were able to protect their position only by
defaulting on a substantial scale: outstandings, which had been negli-
gible in the immediately preceding years, leapt to 9.8 per cent of the
tax demand in 1930/31. The major relief came with the cut in the
tax rate in 1931/32. That cut was sufficient, combined with a modest
the Pegu administration. For example, it was said of Thatoˆn District in 1930/31
that ‘better results would have been produced if the problem [high outstandings]
had been tackled with greater vigour at the outset and with adequate control from
the district office’: RLRAB, 1930/31, p. 7.
38 The modest rise in the capitation tax demand the following year reflected a
smaller cut in the rate—of one-fifth.
39 RLRAB, 1933/34, p. 10.
40 RLRAB, 1934/35, pp. 8–9.
41 RLRAB, 1931/32, p. 9.
42 RLRAB, 1932/33, p. 9.
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level of remissions, to ensure that outstandings were kept extremely
low in 1931/32, and in the three subsequent years disappeared
entirely. Of course, the cost to the administration was a substantial
fall in collections. At its lowest, in 1931/32, the income from the
capitation tax in Tharrawaddy District was just 69.8 per cent of its
pre-crisis peak, which had been in 1929/30.
The administration of the capitation tax in Insein District was
more volatile. In the crisis year 1930/31 there was an upsurge in
remissions, to 17.8 per cent of the tax demand. When, in the follow-
ing year, the tax rate was cut, the level of remissions was reduced:
but perhaps too sharply, for outstandings then soared, to 14.2 per
cent of the demand in 1932/33. The cut in the rate, moderate remis-
sions, and high outstandings meant, of course, a collapse in collec-
tions. The income raised by the capitation tax in Insein in 1932/33
was only 59.2 per cent of the 1929/30 figure.
III
To return to James Scott and Michael Adas. It must now be fully
evident that James Scott’s assertion—in its bald form—that through
the depression years the British administration in Burma ruthlessly
enforced its tax demands in the rice delta, does not stand. Rather,
with both the land revenue and the capitation tax, the administra-
tion agreed substantial cuts in the rates and considerably enhanced
remissions. And it did so at considerable cost to its own financial
position. Comparing 1932/33 with 1929/30, the income from the
land revenue in Pegu and Irrawaddy Divisions had fallen from Rs
20.0 million to Rs 15.0 million, a drop of 25.0 per cent, the income
from the capitation tax in the same divisions, from Rs 3.6 million to
Rs 2.5 million, a drop of 30.5 per cent.43
43 RLRAB, 1929/30, pp. 35, 39; RLRAB, 1932/33, pp. 27, 31. With the salaries
and fixed allowances of its officials accounting for more than half of the govern-
ment’s expenditure from revenue, falls in the revenue on this scale clearly created
major problems for the administration as an administration. From September 1931
new recruits to the service were appointed at the bottom point of the appropriate
scale, on salaries cut by 15 per cent. In the following year the salaries of all officials
were cut by 10 per cent, later reduced to 5 per cent. Interestingly, a retrenchment
committee appointed in August 1933 and dominated by local businessmen ques-
tioned whether, in view of the substantial reduction in land revenue rates, ‘the
present system of land records and land revenue assessment is not more elaborate
and expensive than the Province can afford and whether methods, at once simpler
and more capable of automatic application, will not have to be devised’: Report of the
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But in one crucial context, James Scott is on strong ground. It
is also clear from the text and the tables above that the British
administration took action—cutting tax rates and increasing remis-
sions—not in anticipation of the onset of the economic crisis in the
final months of 1930 but after, in some cases long after, it had struck
the rice delta with full force. In the administration of the land rev-
enue in Tharrawaddy, Hanthawaddy, and Pegu in the crisis year
1930/31, the revenue demand was held at roughly the level of the
previous year and remissions were kept extremely low, so that in
order to protect their position, landowners were forced to default on
a substantial scale. It was not until the administration year 1932/33
that land revenue rates were reduced throughout the rice delta.
There was no cut in the rates of capitation tax until the year 1931/
32: and although in the previous year, the crisis year, the local
administrations in Tharrawaddy and Insein—indeed in every district
in Lower Burma—had substantially increased remissions, in most
cases action had been taken only after 1 January 1931, when the tax
came due. This argument can be put in another way, one which
focuses on the central concern of James Scott and Michael Adas.
The British administration in Burma cut tax rates and increased
remissions after the outbreak of the Hsaya San rebellion in the last
days of 1930. While it may well have been markedly flexible over
the depression years as a whole, in the final weeks before that erup-
tion—with rice prices plummeting—it was strict and unyielding.
The final issue—how much relief did the reductions in tax rates
and the increased remissions provide for the cultivators in the rice
delta during the depression years—is far more difficult to settle. The
difficulty lies mainly in the fact that any effective consideration of
this issue must seek to capture the considerable variations in experi-
ence—variations by place, time, and, crucially, by occupation—
among the agriculturists of the Lower Burma delta. As is clear from
the discussion and tables above, there were marked differences
between districts in the administration of the land revenue and the
capitation tax: cuts in land revenue rates during the depression years
were determined district-by-district, while there was also consider-
able variation between districts in the levels of remission granted.
But perhaps more importantly there were major differences—once
Burma Retrenchment Committee 1934 (Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationery,
1934), p. 6.
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again, in terms of the impact of rate cuts and remissions—as
between the main categories of agriculturist. The landless labourer
would clearly secure no direct benefit from a more lenient adminis-
tration of the land revenue but, in terms of his financial position as
a whole, would gain considerably more from a cut in the rate of
capitation tax than would the major landowner. A modest reduction
in land revenue rates might be crucial in securing the position of the
marginal owner-cultivator but make little difference to those who
owned hundreds of acres. Ideally, therefore, assessment of the
impact of the reductions in tax rates and the increased remissions
must specify place, time, and class—must be with reference to, say,
the landless labourer in Tharrawaddy District in 1930/31. Unfortu-
nately the primary data rarely yield that detail. In particular, the
revenue statistics published by the colonial administration and used
extensively in this paper, concerned as they are only with aggregates
and averages, miss entirely the crucial perspective on distribution.
There is a further difficulty. Assessment of the impact of the
administration’s tax cuts and increased remissions on the agricultur-
ist (on the main categories of agriculturist) requires some account
of the agriculturist’s overall financial position, for clearly the greater
the share of tax payments in his expenditures, the greater the impact
of a given measure of relief. There are numerous reports on, for
example, the wages of agricultural labourers, cultivation costs, loan
charges, scattered through government publications in the early
1930s. But the only systematic investigation of ‘the agriculturist’s’
finances during the depression crisis was that undertaken in Han-
thawaddy between November 1930 and October 1933 as part of the
third revision of the district’s revenue settlement. These data are
not without their problems.
The Hanthawaddy settlement report contains two sets of statist-
ical data which may be of value in this context.44 The first is a calcu-
lation of ‘cost of living’—in fact core expenditure on food, clothing,
and shelter—per household. The calculation is based on a survey of
well over a thousand households—the households of landowners and
tenants. This material has three weaknesses. The settlement report
cheerfully warns that ‘no great reliance should be placed on the
44 Report on the Third Revision Settlement of the Hanthawaddy District of Lower Burma,
1930–33 (Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationery, 1934), pp. 11, 13, 64–5,
169.
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amounts shown’, for they had been calculated from accounts of
expenditures ‘which the cultivator repeats largely from memory’.45
Second, the average area of paddy land worked by the households
surveyed was 38.33 acres, which suggests that the survey was skewed
towards the more substantial agriculturists.46 And finally, to restate
an earlier point, an average figure drawn from a thousand and more
observations obviously says nothing about distribution or range.47 But
for what it is worth, the figure calculated for living costs was Rs 263
per household or, with the average household comprising four adults
and two children, Rs 44 per head.
The second set of statistical data is a calculation of the costs of
rice cultivation that includes ‘everything possible of capital, mat-
erials and labour’. A figure is given for each of the district’s nineteen
tracts, and they range from Rs 12.50 to Rs 16.50 per acre. If the
average area worked was, as above, 38.33 acres, cultivation costs per
household would lie between Rs 479 and Rs 632: for the owner-
cultivator in Hanthawaddy, working on average 14.30 acres (see fn.
46), cultivation costs would be between Rs 179 and Rs 236. Two
further calculations are worth noting. The average amount of tem-
porary debt per household—debts contracted and repaid within
twelve months—is given as Rs 137, of permanent debt, Rs 676: in
terms of debt per acre (again assuming the household works on aver-
age 38.33 acres), Rs 3.60 and Rs 17.60. And finally, average expend-
iture in interest payments per household is given as Rs 38.00, that
is Rs 1.00 per acre and Rs 6.30 per head.
These calculations provide a valuable perspective on the figures
for tax demands, remissions, collections, and outstandings during the
depression crisis. The capitation tax was levied at Rs 5 for a married
man before the crisis, Rs 3–12 in 1931/32. For the average house-
hold surveyed during the Hanthawaddy settlement (with four adults,
and assuming two were male), the annual capitation tax bill would
therefore have been Rs 10, then reduced to Rs 7–8. That was a very
modest charge when set against, for example, living costs of Rs 263,
cultivation costs of at least Rs 479, or even expenditure in interest
45 Ibid., p. 11. The report continued, with some bitterness: ‘It is doubtful if the
results of this enquiry are commensurate with the time and labour spent on it.’
46 At this time, the average area worked by an owner-cultivator in Hanthawaddy
was 14.30 acres, by a tenant, 31.06 acres: ibid., p. 32.
47 The figure given below compounds this weakness, for it is the average for the
district. The settlement report also gives the figure for each of the district’s nine-
teen tracts.
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payments of Rs 38. At the same time, the Hanthawaddy households
were the households of landowners and tenants, and, it was sug-
gested above, more substantial owners and tenants at that. In other
words, for poorer agriculturists—the marginal owner-cultivator and,
even more so, the landless labourer—the capitation tax would have
been a more severe burden, obviously so. Just how much more severe
can be judged from the observation that the cost of food and shelter
for a labourer at the beginning of the 1930s was around Rs 5 a
month.48 Therefore in the crisis year 1930/31, for example, the mar-
ried labourer paid in capitation tax the equivalent of one month’s
food and shelter: reduction of the rate to Rs 3–12 in 1931/32 and
to Rs 4 from 1932/33 would have provided a significant measure of
relief. But there is a final important consideration. By no means
every person in Lower Burma paid the capitation tax. As noted earl-
ier, not only was it levied only on males between the ages of eighteen
and sixty but certain important groups within that category—govern-
ment officials, school teachers, and monks—were exempt. Even so,
the proportion of the population assessed for the tax in the early
1930s appears to have been markedly low, particularly when it is
noted that, given the low life-expectancy of that time, relatively few
people would have been over sixty. In 1934/35 the proportion was
between 17 per cent and 23 per cent in the different rice districts.49
And within those low proportions—to bring back an earlier point—
many would certainly not have struggled to pay.
For landowners, the big tax was undoubtedly the land revenue,
which, of course, only they paid. Just how serious a burden it could
be is suggested by a further set of figures in the Hanthawaddy settle-
ment report. These show the average amount of land revenue paid
per matured acre as Rs 3.70 in 1930/31, and falling to Rs 3.12
in 1932/33.50 Therefore, for the average Hanthawaddy household,
assuming again that it worked 38.33 acres, the land revenue bill in
1930/31 would have been Rs 142—the equivalent of more than half
the household’s outlay, Rs 263, in living costs. Looked at another
way, a land revenue cost of Rs 3.70 an acre compares with cultivation
costs per acre—for capital, materials, and labour—of between Rs
12.50 and Rs 16.50. From both perspectives, the land revenue is
clearly seen as a major charge on the landowner’s cash resources.
48 Furnivall, Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma, p. 76.
49 RLRAB, 1934/35, p. 9.
50 Report on the Third Revision Settlement of the Hanthawaddy District of Lower Burma,
1930–33, p. 139.
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It is hardly surprising that, from the onset of the economic crisis,
landowners, in large organized meetings, called for drastic cuts in
land revenue rates.51
Undoubtedly they would be disappointed by the administration’s
response. The fall in the amount of land revenue paid per acre in
Hanthawaddy between 1930/31 and 1932/33, noted above, was a
fall of only 15.7 per cent. The fall in land revenue collections in
Tharrawaddy, Hanthawaddy, and Pegu (calculated above from
Tables 1–3) was more severe—43.6 per cent in Pegu. But none of
these measures comes close to matching the fall in the price of rice
during the economic crisis.52 In other words, despite the administra-
tion’s concessions, the real claim of the land revenue on the land-
owner, already considerable, rose.
IV
This paper has provided two firm conclusions. During the economic
crisis of the early 1930s, the British administration in Burma agreed
substantial cuts in rates for both the land revenue and the capitation
tax and considerably enhanced remissions. But it did so after the
economic crisis struck the Burma delta with full force—although it
might be felt that the suddenness with which rice prices gave way
over the final months of 1930 meant that the administration simply
had insufficient time to act in advance.
It is far more difficult to assess the extent to which the administra-
tion’s measures provided relief through the economic crisis for the
rice delta’s agriculturists. However, there are grounds for arguing
that the impact of the reductions in the rate of capitation tax and
the increased remissions was limited. Only around one person in
five—20.16 per cent of the population in the Pegu and Irrawaddy
Divisions in 1930/3153—was assessed for the tax. And among the
assessees, those with even the most modest resources—the tenant
51 See, for example, RGWB, 24 November 1930, p. 8.
52 The extent of that fall can be indicated in a number of ways. In May 1931 the
administration reported that the price of paddy had fallen to about Rs 65 per one
hundred baskets from an average ‘in recent years’ of Rs 150 or more: Secretary,
Finance Department, Government of Burma to Secretary to the Government of
India, Finance Department, 7 May 1931. NAI, Finance, 17/67, 1932. The price was
to fall considerably further.
53 RLRAB, 1930/31, p. 37.
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working a few hectares, the marginal owner-cultivator—are unlikely
to have found the capitation tax a serious burden, even before the
rate was cut. The agriculturist most threatened by the tax, and
therefore most relieved by the cuts and increased remissions, was
the landless labourer, a class that must include the large number of
Indian migrant labourers who found work in the rice delta.54 The
impact of the reductions in land revenue rates and the increased
remissions was similarly limited. Only those who owned land drew
direct relief: and that relief, if the figures above are a secure indica-
tion, was substantially less than the fall in the price of rice. But
during the economic crisis of the early 1930s, the population of the
Burma rice delta had access to or had themselves developed further
mechanisms to mitigate the impact of the collapse in the rice price—
an expansion in rice production and sales to compensate for the fall
in price; a decline in the prices of essential items of consumption,
including, notably, that of imported textiles; and defaulting on loans.
These further mechanisms for survival will be the focus of another
paper.
54 If the capitation tax drew hostility from a wider range of the rural population,
this was perhaps due in part to its obvious inequity. Moreover it is quite possible
that many who could pay the tax with ease were nevertheless very hostile to it on
political grounds. Michael Adas notes that ‘the Burmans had traditionally regarded
the payment of the head tax as an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the govern-
ment that collected it’: Prophets of Rebellion, p. 74.
